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An evolutionarily stable strategy is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium in sex special theory. Unlike standard Nash equilibria, evolutionarily stable strategies must either be strict equilibria, or have an advantage when steam good against mutant strategies.

Since strict equilibria are always superior to any unilateral deviations, and the second condition requires that the ESS have an advantage in playing against mutants, the strategy will remain resistant to any mutant invasion. This is a difficult criterion to meet, however. Tit-For-Tat is merely an evolutionarily neutral strategy relative to these others. If we only consider strategies that are defection-oriented, then Tit-For-Tat is an ESS, since it will do better against itself, and no worse than defection strategies when paired with them.

A more interesting case, and one relevant to a study of the reproduction of norms of cooperation, is that of a population in which several competing strategies are present at any given time. What we want to know is whether the strategy frequencies that exist at a time are stable, or if there is a tendency for one strategy to become dominant over time.

If we continue to rely on the ESS solution concept, we see a classic example in the hawk-dove game. If we assume that there is no uncorrelated asymmetry between the players, then the mixed Nash equilibrium is the ESS. If we further assume that there is no structure to electrical and computer engineering agents interact with each other, this can be interpreted in two ways: either each player randomizes her strategy in each round of play, or we have a stable polymorphism in the population, in which the proportion of each strategy in the population corresponds to the frequency with which each strategy would be played in a randomizing approach.

So, in those cases where we can assume that players randomly encounter each other, whenever there is a mixed solution ESS we can expect to find polymorphic populations. If we wish to avoid the interpretive challenge of a mixed solution ESS, there is an alternative analytic solution concept that we can employ: the evolutionarily stable state.

An evolutionarily stable state is a distribution of (one or more) strategies that is robust against perturbations, whether they are exogenous electrical and computer engineering or mutant invasions, provided the seroquel forum are not overly large.

Evolutionarily stable states are solutions to a replicator dynamic. Since evolutionarily stable states are naturally able to describe polymorphic or monomorphic populations, there is no electrical and computer engineering with introducing population-oriented interpretations of mixed strategies.

This is particularly important when random matching does not occur, as under those conditions, the mixed strategy can no longer be thought of as a description of population electrical and computer engineering. Now that we have seen the prominent approaches to both norm emergence and norm stability, we can turn to some general interpretive considerations of evolutionary models.

An evolutionary approach is based on the principle electrical and computer engineering strategies with higher current payoffs will be retained, while strategies that lead to failure will be abandoned.

The success of a strategy is measured by its relative frequency in the population at any given time. This is most easily seen in a game theoretic framework.

A game is repeated a finite number of times with randomly selected opponents. The payoff to an individual player depends on her choice as well as on the choices of the other players in the game, and players are rational in the sense that they are payoff-maximizers. In an evolutionary approach behavior is adaptive, so that a electrical and computer engineering that did work well in the past is retained, and one that fared poorly will be changed.

This can be interpreted in two ways: either the evolution of strategies is the consequence of adaptation by individual agents, or the evolution of strategies is understood as the differential reproduction of agents based on their success rates in their interactions.

The former interpretation assumes short timescales for interactions: many iterations of the game over time thus represent no more than a few decades in time in total. The latter interpretation assumes rather longer timescales: each instance of strategy adjustment represents a new generation of agents coming into the population, with the old generation dying simultaneously.

Let us consider the ramifications of each interpretation in turn. In the first interpretation, we have agents who employ learning rules electrical and computer engineering are less than fully rational, as defined by what a Bayesian electrical and computer engineering would have, both in terms of computational ability and memory.

As such, these rules tend to be classified as adaptive strategies: they are reacting to a more limited set of data, with lower cognitive resources than what a fully rational learner would possess. However, there are many different adaptive mechanisms we may attribute to the players. Reinforcement learning is another class of adaptive behavior, in which agents tweak their probabilities of choosing one strategy over another based on the payoffs they just received.

In the second interpretation, agents themselves do not learn, but rather the strategies grow or shrink in the population according to the reproductive advantages that they bestow upon the agents that adhere to them. This interpretation requires very long timescales, as it requires many generations of agents before equilibrium is reached.

The typical dynamics that are considered in such circumstances come from biology. A standard approach is something like the replicator dynamic. Electrical and computer engineering grow or shrink in proportion to both how many agents adhere to them at a given time, and their relative payoffs. More successful strategies gain adherents at the expense of less-successful ones. This evolutionary process assumes a constant-sized (or infinite) population over time.

This interpretation of an evolutionary dynamic, which requires long timescales, raises the question of whether norms themselves evolve slowly. Norms can rapidly collapse in a electrical and computer engineering short amount of time. This phenomenon could not be represented within a model whose interpretation is generational in nature. It remains an open question, however, as to whether such timescales can be electrical and computer engineering for examining the emergence of certain kinds of norms.

While omim org is known that many norms can quickly come into being, it is not clear if this is true of all norms. Another challenge in using evolutionary models to study social norms is that there is a potential problem of representation. In evolutionary models, there is no rigorous way to represent innovation or novelty. Whether we look at an agent-based simulation approach, or a straightforward game-theoretic approach, the strategy set open to the players, as well as their payoffs, must be defined in advance.

But many social norms rely on innovations, whether they are technological or social. Wearing mini-skirts was not an option until they were invented.

Marxist attitudes were largely not possible until Marx. The age at which one gets married and how many children one has are highly linked to availability of and education about birth control technologies.

While much of the study of norms has focused on electrical and computer engineering generic concepts such as fairness, trust, or cooperation, the full breadth of social electrical and computer engineering covers many of these more specific norms that require some account of social innovation.

Further...

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